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Political Authority and Unjust Wars 
 
How should we conceive the relationship between the moral principles which govern 
justified resort to war (jus ad bellum principles) and those which place constraints on how 
wars should be fought (jus in bello principles)? According to traditional just war theory, 
as long as combatants fight within the constraints of jus in bello (most notably, by 
refraining from using certain weapons or tactics), they are permitted to kill enemy 
combatants independently of whether their war satisfies jus ad bellum principles, 
including the principle of having a just cause.1 This is because the right to kill enemy 
combatants is traditionally conceived as an extension of the right to personal self-
defence: just as you are permitted to use necessary and proportionate force to defend 
yourselves against those who pose a threat of lethal harm to you, soldiers are permitted to 
use necessary and proportionate force to defend themselves against those who pose a 
threat of lethal harm to them.  
This view, known as the doctrine of the “moral equality of combatants,” has been 
recently rejected by an increasing number of philosophers, most notably Jeff McMahan 
(2009), Cécile Fabre (2012), David Rodin (2002) and Helen Frowe (2014).2 While 
buttressed by a number of sophisticated arguments, the move made by these philosophers 
is ultimately simple, and consists in questioning the assumption that we are permitted to 
use necessary and proportionate force to defend ourselves against whoever poses a threat 
of lethal harm to us. For surely we are not permitted to do so if our target has done 
                                                 
1 The traditional view is articulated in the classic work of Michael Walzer (2006) and implemented in 
international law. 
2 For a helpful overview of the debate, see Lazar 2016.  
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nothing to lose her right not to be attacked, whereas we have. If I wrongfully attack you 
and you can defend yourself only by killing me in self-defence, you are permitted to do 
so. But suppose now that the only way for me to defend myself from your defensive 
attack is to kill you. Would it be plausible to say that you and I are “morally equal”? 
After all, with my wrongful attack I did something to lose my right not to be killed, 
whereas you did nothing to lose yours. But if you retain your right against being killed 
and I don’t, we should conclude that while you are permitted to kill me, I’m not permitted 
to kill you.  
The same holds for combatants, “revisionists” such as McMahan, Fabre, Rodin 
and Frowe argue. Since the moral principles that regulate the use of force in war are the 
same that regulate the use of force in ordinary life,3 we should reject the doctrine of the 
moral equality of combatants for the simple reason that while combatants fighting for an 
unjust cause lose their right not to be killed, combatants fighting for a just cause don’t. 
Thus, the latter are permitted to attack the former (within the constraints of jus in bello),4 
but not vice versa.5  
This means that combatants are to be held responsible not only for their conduct 
during the war (i.e. for complying with jus in bello principles), but also for their choice to 
fight a certain war in the first place (i.e. for complying with jus ad bellum principles).6 
                                                 
3 This view is sometimes called “reductivism” (Frowe 2014, 2). Reductivism is one of the main tenets of 
revisionism. 
4 Henceforth this qualification will be taken for granted in the paper. 
5 As others have noticed (McMahan 2009, 33–34; Ryan 2011, 14–18), this view is not new, but draws on 
what was considered the orthodox view between the thirteenth and the seventeenth century.  
6 Indeed, according to revisionists like McMahan, it is conceptually impossible to comply with jus in bello 
principles unless jus ad bellum principles are also met. This is because the main function of jus in bello 
principles is to specify when inflicting certain harm counts as necessary and proportionate for the purposes 
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Contra the traditional view, they are not permitted to take part in any war they are 
ordered to fight. Rather, they must take responsibility for their actions and do what they 
can to establish whether the war in question is just. When they lack reasons to believe 
that it is just, their duty is to disobey the order to fight (McMahan 2009, 144; Fabre 2012, 
77–78).  
Of course, lacking sufficient reasons to believe that the war is just is not 
tantamount to having sufficient reasons to believe that the war is unjust. Despite their 
best efforts, combatants might lack sufficient reason to believe either claim. In this case, 
according to some prominent revisionists, combatants should presume that their duty is 
not to fight. This is because in fighting, combatants risk contributing to the killing of 
innocents,7 and their duty not to contribute to the intentional killing of the innocent is 
ceteris paribus stronger than their duty to contribute to achieving whatever aim is 
pursued by the war, including the aim of preventing innocents from being killed (since 
killing is normally considered worse than letting die). For these reasons, revisionists 
argue, we should conclude Thus, as McMahan puts it, “in conditions of uncertainty, the 
moral presumption is against fighting” (McMahan 2009, 144; see also Fabre 2009, 59). 
I believe that both the traditional and the revisionist view capture important 
aspects of how we should think about the morality of war. The claim that the justice of 
the cause matters to determine whether combatants are permitted to fight can be hardly 
                                                                                                                                                 
of achieving some good; but in the case of combatants fighting on the unjust side, there simply is no good 
being pursued by them whose achievement can justify the infliction of any amount of harm. Thus, only 
combatants fighting for a just cause are in a position to comply with jus in bello principles. 
7 Following McMahan (2009, 10–15), I use the term “innocents” to refer to those who have done nothing to 
make themselves morally liable to military attack. Thus, by innocents I do not simply mean non-
combatants, but also combatants fighting on the just side. 
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resisted, and this explains the success of the revisionist approach (to the point that this 
approach can now be said to be the new orthodoxy among philosophers).8 However, 
revisionists fail to pay sufficient attention to an important aspect of the problem, namely 
that combatants typically do not act as private agents engaging in ordinary self-defence, 
but as members of a political body; and that qua members of a political body, special 
duties apply to them. Unless we subscribe to philosophical anarchism (the view that there 
is no duty to obey the law as such – (Wolff 1998; Simmons 1979),9 the claim that these 
duties can affect the permissibility of taking part in war seems intuitively plausible, and 
deserves closer scrutiny than it has received so far.10 After all, loyalty and political 
obedience are precisely the notions invoked by Walzer to support the traditional view that 
combatants should obey the order to fight, rather than investigating the justice of the 
cause pursued by their state (Walzer 2006, 39–40) Thus, those who intend to reject his 
approach will have to take seriously these notions. 
Taking seriously the importance of the duty to obey the law however, does not 
commit us to endorsing Walzer’s view. The problem with the latter (besides the fact that 
he does not clearly distinguish between the duty to obey the law and considerations of 
loyalty to one’s country), is that it overstates the force of the duty to obey and completely 
disregards the importance of the just cause. While Walzer is certainly right in 
acknowledging the importance of the fact that combatants normally operate within a 
structure of political responsibilities, this is not enough to conclude, as he does, that their 
                                                 
8 See for example, McPherson 2004; Coady 2007; Bazargan 2014. Recent (qualified) defenses of the 
traditional view can be found in Kutz 2005; Kutz 2016; Benbaji 2011; Lazar 2013; Lazar 2015a. 
9 As far as I know, none of the main proponents of the revisionist approach has explicitly endorsed 
philosophical anarchism. 
10 McMahan does address this problem. I will consider some of his arguments below.  
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will is never engaged in deciding whether to fight, but only in deciding how to fight. 
Saying that Rommel should not be considered a “wilful wrongdoer, but a loyal and 
obedient subject and citizen,” (Walzer 2006, 39) and that his obedience to Hitler is 
enough to make it permissible for him to fight, is implausible for the reasons that 
revisionists have so powerfully articulated in their work. 
Thus, a plausible account of the morality of war will have to strike a middle path 
between these two views: it will have to acknowledge the relevance of the just cause in 
establishing whether combatants can permissibly fight, while also paying attention to the 
normative implications of the fact that combatants typically act as members of political 
bodies. These are the two desiderata to be met in order to overcome the problems that 
afflict the traditional and the revisionist view respectively. Providing such an account is 
the aim of this paper.  
I will argue that when members of a legitimate state are ordered to fight, they are 
placed under a pro-tanto obligation to obey.11 This obligation does not depend for its 
validity on the justice of the cause being pursued. However, when the war is unjust, this 
obligation can be overridden (under certain conditions) by a weightier obligation, namely 
the obligation not to contribute to the unjustified killing of innocents. Moreover, I will 
argue that combatants are under a duty to do what they can to find out whether the war 
they are ordered to fight is unjust. As it will become clear, this view captures the insights 
of both the traditional and the revisionist view, while at the same time avoiding the 
problems that afflict each of them. The view goes some way towards rescuing the 
doctrine of the moral equality of combatants, while retaining the main insight of 
                                                 
11 “Pro-tanto obligations” are to be contrasted with “all-things-considered” obligations. They are genuine 
obligations, which become decisive unless they are overridden by stronger countervailing considerations.   
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revisionism about the importance of jus as bellum considerations for the permissibility to 
fight. 
I proceed in six steps. I start by considering a recent attempt to resist the 
revisionist challenge by looking at the duties that combatants have qua members of 
political communities (section 2). I call this “the political argument for the duty to fight”. 
Since my aim is to defend a version of this argument, it will be helpful to consider the 
shortcomings of this earlier attempt. I then introduce my own version of the political 
argument by addressing a powerful objection raised by Jeff McMahan (section 3). In 
answering this objection, I articulate a justification for the existence a pro-tanto duty to 
obey the order to fight, independently of the justice of the war at hand.12 The nature of 
this duty is then further clarified in section 4, where I explain how its pro-tanto force is to 
be understood in terms of the existence of “presumptive reasons” to obey the law. Section 
5 addresses four possible objections to the model of presumptive reasons. Section 6 
concludes by outlining the relationship between my view and the revisionist as well as 
the orthodox view. 
 
2) A non-teleological formulation of the duty to obey 
A version of what I have called the “political argument” has recently been offered by 
Cheyney Ryan (2011).13 According to Ryan, combatants are under an obligation to obey 
the order to fight wars, even when unjust, because by doing so they sustain political 
institutions that perform important tasks, including the task of fighting wars that are 
                                                 
12 In this paper I will use “duty” and “obligation” interchangeably.  
13 David Estlund (2007) also offers a version of the political argument, but since I criticize his view at 
length elsewhere (omitted), I will not discuss it at length here. 
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generally just. Although Ryan calls this the “Argument to Democratic Duty”, democratic 
procedures do not play much of a role in it.14 His point is rather that political institutions 
are necessary to protect our lives, as well as important moral values. Although these 
institutions will sometimes go wrong, they generally wage just wars (i.e. fight for just 
causes justly). Thus, the reason why we have a duty to obey even when we are 
commanded to fight an unjust war is that this is required in order to “protect our 
protectors,” as Hobbes puts it, i.e. in order to support the institutions that play such a 
fundamental role.15 
I think this argument points in the right direction, but the obvious reply to it is that 
even if we grant the existence of a duty to fight when required to by our state, this surely 
must be a pro-tanto duty – one that can be overridden, at least in some circumstances, by 
our duty not to contribute to the killing of innocents. Thus, while something like Ryan’s 
argument can ground a duty to fight an unjust war, we should certainly expect the duty to 
be overridden, at least some times, by the competing duty not to contribute to the killing 
of innocents without justification.16  
This however, is a move that Ryan wants to resist. To make his point, he resorts 
to a parallel with the criminal justice system: “suppose that the institution of capital 
                                                 
14  The reason for calling this argument “democratic” seems to be simply to exclude its application to unjust 
political institutions, such as the Nazi regime (Ryan 2011, 22). 
15 It’s worth noticing here that the “protective institutions” that Ryan is talking about are not simply 
military institutions, but the broader political institutions of which military institutions are simply a 
component (Ryan 2011, 21). 
16 To be sure, all wars involve killing some innocents. Even just wars do, since avoiding casualties is 
impossible. But while killing innocents as collateral damage in pursuing a just cause can be justifiable all-
things-considered under certain circumstances, killing innocents to pursue an unjust cause is not justifiable 
in the same way. 
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punishment, like a democracy’s protective institutions, is necessary to protecting oneself 
and one’s loved ones. Suppose that one’s refusal (as executioner) to execute an innocent 
person would jeopardize the entire institution in ways that render oneself and one’s loved 
ones vulnerable to unjust attack. Suppose for example that you know that if you fail to 
execute the innocent person, you and your loved ones will be set upon by a band of 
criminal marauders, who are no longer deterred by the threat of capital punishment. At 
the very least, there is a real dilemma here” (Ryan 2011, 30–31). The suggestion is that 
disobeying the order to fight an unjust war would have similar catastrophic 
consequences.  
I find this argument implausible.17 Notice, to begin with, that even if it was 
plausible, revisionists could reply that only when these catastrophic consequences are 
likely to be realized, combatants should obey the order to fight an unjust war. Whenever 
they have reason to believe that no similar consequences would follow, combatants could 
permissibly disobey. Indeed, they would have a duty to do so. The only way for Ryan to 
resist this reply is to argue that each and every case of disobedience is likely to produce 
these catastrophic consequences, but surely this cannot be right. It is never the case that 
isolated cases of disobedience jeopardize the existence of the state. Indeed, as many have 
noticed, even generalized disobedience does not compromise the state’s existence or its 
capacity to perform its tasks (Simmons 1979; Green 1988).  
The problem here is that Ryan operates within what we might call a “teleological 
understanding” of the duty to obey the law – one that grounds such a duty in the fact that 
                                                 
17 Incidentally, it’s curious to see what many consider as the best known reductio of consequentialism 
(namely, the idea that sometimes punishing the innocent would produce the best consequences) here used 
as an argument against revisionism. 
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disobedience is likely to undermine the ability of political institutions to provide those 
benefits that justify their existence. Interestingly, he is not alone. Prominent revisionists, 
including McMahan, also think about the duty to obey the law in these terms (McMahan 
2009, 71–75). However, this is not how we should think about it. Although the 
justification for political authority and political obligation ultimately does depend on the 
fact that states provide us with fundamentally important benefits, our duty to obey the 
law does not hinge on the question of whether disobedience would compromise the 
state’s capacity to provide these benefits, but rather on the fact that when the state 
commands us to act in certain ways it creates for us a pro-tanto duty to act as 
commanded.  
To see this point, consider promissory obligations. While it is plausible to suggest 
that the justification for the duty to keep promises ultimately relies on the fact that we 
benefit from the existence of a practice that enables us to create special bonds with other 
people, this is not to say that our duty to keep individual promises is conditional on the 
fact that doing so is required not to threaten the existence of this practice. Our duty to 
keep individual promises rather depends on the fact that when we promise to φ we 
thereby create new special moral reasons for us to φ, reasons that we did not have before 
promising. If you fail to keep your next promise, the existence of the practice of 
promising is not endangered in any way (this risk would only exist if a significant 
number of people failed to keep their promises), and yet it seems uncontroversial that you 
do have a pro-tanto duty to keep your promise.18 That duty might be overridden, but 
cannot be ignored. 
                                                 
18 Which is why you have a pro-tanto duty to keep your promise even if nobody would know if you didn’t. 
 10 
The duty to obey the law of legitimate states is to be conceived along the same 
lines. As long as states have legitimate authority, even a relatively high level of 
disobedience does not compromise their capacity to perform their crucial functions. And 
yet, when a legitimate state orders us to φ, it places us under a pro-tanto duty to φ. This is 
how political authority is normally conceived in the philosophical debate. Of course, this 
is not to yet say that we are right in conceiving it in this way. What we need to do now is 
explain why states have legitimate authority and what it means to say that the duty to 
obey the law of legitimate states is pro-tanto. This is the task to which I turn in the next 
section in order to develop my own version of the political argument for the duty to fight.  
 
3) The “moral alchemy” objection 
I think that Ryan is right both in grounding the duty to fight unjust wars in our duty to 
obey the law of legitimate states and in grounding the duty to obey the law in the fact that 
states provide us with vitally important benefits, most notably security and the rule of 
law. His mistake however, is in his characterization of the nature of the duty to obey the 
law. This duty, like all the duties imposed by the state, is only pro-tanto, which means 
that it will have to be balanced with other duties we have. Thus, when a legitimate state 
commands its citizens to fight, they do acquire a moral duty to do so. But when the war is 
unjust, this duty will be overridden, at least under certain conditions, by their duty not to 
contribute to the unjustified killing of innocents.  
To see this point, consider again the case of promises. What happens when I break 
my promise to meet you for lunch in order to assist someone injured? The standard 
analysis of this case is that while the duty to keep my promise is overridden by a 
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weightier duty, it still maintains its original force. And yet we have seen that by failing to 
keep my promise I don’t jeopardize in any way the institution of promising. The capacity 
of this institution to perform its valuable functions is in no way compromised by the fact 
that our duty to keep our promises is sometimes overridden by competing duties. 
Are the duties imposed by the law special in this sense? They don’t seem to be. 
While I am driving the injured person to the hospital I can permissibly disrespect the 
speed limit or the traffic light to increase the chances of saving her.19 These are cases that 
no one finds mysterious. So, why should there be a special problem when the same 
argument is applied to the duty to obey the order to fight? The answer is that there 
shouldn’t. The two cases should be treated in the same way. Just like I have a pro-tanto 
duty to respect the traffic light, but this duty can be overridden when I have stronger duty 
to ignore it (as it is the case when ignoring the traffic light would improve the chances of 
saving someone’s life), I have a pro-tanto duty to obey the order to fight, but this duty 
can be overridden when I have stronger duty not to fight (as it is the case when fighting 
would likely lead me to contribute the unjustified killing of innocents). 
This view provides a straightforward and suitably modest formulation of the 
political argument for the duty to fight, as opposed to the formulations offered by Walzer 
and Ryan, but is subject to the following powerful objection: how could the fact that a 
state commands me to fight an unjust war give me any reason to fight? Fighting an unjust 
war typically involves killing innocents, and killing innocents is wrong. How could the 
                                                 
19 To be sure, many legislations will include a legal defense of necessity to which we can avail ourselves in 
these cases, but our moral permission to disrespect the speed limit is not conditional on such defense being 
available. The obligation to obey the law may be overridden by competing moral obligations that are not 
incorporated in the law. 
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fact that the state requires us to commit something wrong give us any reason, even pro-
tanto, to do so? Following McMahan, we might argue that this view “presupposes a form 
of moral alchemy that is difficult to accept. How can certain people’s establishment of 
political relations among themselves confer on them a right to harm or kill others, when 
the harming or killing would be impermissible in the absence of the relevant relations?” 
(McMahan 2009, 82). Indeed, taking seriously the importance of jus ad bellum 
considerations seems to commit us to the conclusion that if the war we are required to 
fight is unjust, not only do we lack the right to fight enemy combatants, but we might 
have a duty to help them fighting against our own fellow citizens, since the latter are 
posing an unjust threat to the former (Fabre 2012, 80–81). 
To address this objection, we need to pay attention to the fact that the political 
relations that McMahan refers to are necessary in order for individuals to live together 
peacefully and to respect each other’s rights. For the justification of political authority, as 
we have seen already, is grounded in certain important moral tasks that legitimate states 
perform. By performing their legislative, executive and judicial functions, legitimate 
states provide the level of order and coordination that is required for a minimally secure 
life; but states can perform these crucial moral tasks only if they have the moral power to 
impose genuine moral obligations on their subjects. Indeed, this is not so much a 
condition of their ability to perform the tasks above, but it is how they perform them. 
Some of the main problems that states are supposed to solve are coordination problems 
and problems relating to giving a clear content to rights and duties that would be 
otherwise indeterminate. The way in which states do this is by altering the balance of 
reasons that apply to their subjects by imposing moral obligations on them.  
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As it is sometimes put, the commands of the state provide their subjects with binding 
content-independent reasons for action. These reasons are content-independent because 
their force does not depend on the merit of what is commanded. (We have reasons to act 
as commanded independently of the content of what is commanded.) They are binding to 
the extent that they have a special normative force whereby they are not merely added to 
our other reasons for actions, but rather constrain our practical deliberation by pre-
empting, at least to some extent, the inclusion of certain reasons within it. 
I defend this view elsewhere,20 but the details are not important here. In order to 
answer the “moral alchemy” objection we need only to grasp its rationale, which can be 
summarized as follows: states have authority over us because they enable us to discharge 
some of our most important duties of justice.21 One of our most important duties is the 
duty not to expose those living next to us to the dangers typical of the state of nature – 
dangers that are principally created by coordination and assurance problems, lack of 
enforcement, and indeterminacy of the content of rights. We can discharge this duty only 
if we are subject to the authority of the state, i.e. only if we take the commands of the 
state as providing us with binding content-independent reasons for action. This is why 
when the state orders us to φ we thereby acquire a moral obligation (i.e. new binding 
content-independent moral reasons) to φ.  
                                                 
20 (Omitted) 
21 This approach to the problem of political obligation is defended, among others, by Rawls 1999; 
Buchanan 2002; Wellman 2005; Stilz 2009, although each of these authors articulates it in a different way. 
The differences between these views can be bracketed for the purposes of this paper. Below, I keep 
referring to my favourite formulation of the natural duty account of political obligation, but the same 
argument, if successful, goes through on any of its formulations. 
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But as we know, states unfortunately are not perfect. All states will make mistakes 
and require us to sometimes act unjustly. The crucial point, however, is that legitimate 
states will make mistakes (or at least, serious mistakes) “in good faith” – i.e. they will try 
to pass, and normally succeed in passing, laws that enable their citizens to act as they 
should (or at least as they are morally permitted to). You might think that there is a long 
list of profoundly unjust states that work as counterexamples to this characterization, but 
notice that I have been talking of legitimate states. And a necessary condition that states 
need to meet to be legitimate is that of being reasonably just. States that are not 
reasonably just cannot enjoy legitimacy precisely because the point of legitimate political 
authority is to enable individuals to discharge some of their most important duties of 
justice. 
A detailed discussion of the conditions of “reasonable justice” required for a state to 
count as legitimate is beyond the remit of this paper, but the standard generally accepted 
in the literature is that the state in question should neither violate, nor allow the violation 
of, the basic human rights of its members (Shue 2003; Buchanan 2007, 247–49). To this, 
we should add that the state also refrains from intentionally violating the basic human 
rights of non-members. This is because, while there is a tendency to believe that the 
legitimacy of a state depends exclusively on its relationship with its own citizens (i.e. on 
its performing the valuable functions identified above to the benefit of its citizens), I 
believe that how states behave toward other subjects in the world also affects their 
legitimacy. For example, a colonial regime responsible for human rights violations 
abroad would lack legitimacy over its own citizens, even if were to successfully protect 
their human rights (Fabre 2012, 47). 
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It is commonly accepted that only legitimate states have the power to impose moral 
obligations on their subjects. However, it is also commonly accepted that unjust 
commands of a legitimate state do bind, i.e. they do create a pro-tanto obligation for us to 
obey, in the same way in which just commands do. This is because states can only 
perform their delicate coordinative functions if they can provide their subjects with 
content-independent reasons for actions, i.e. reasons whose binding force does not 
depend on their content. As Joseph Raz puts it, “there is no point in having authorities 
unless their determinations are binding even if mistaken, [since] the whole point and 
purpose of authorities…is to pre-empt individual judgment” (Raz 1986, 47–48, 61).22 
To be sure, legitimate states do not have the power to impose on their citizens an 
obligation to do anything they like, for there are things that clearly fall outside the scope 
of their authority. For example, they do not have the power to decide which religion we 
should practice or whom we should marry. But within the scope of their authority, states 
are allowed to make mistakes without thereby losing their capacity to impose pro-tanto 
obligations. 
To better see this point, consider a different sort of authority, namely the authority 
that doctors have over the nurses in their ward. By virtue of this authority, doctors do 
place nurses under a pro-tanto moral obligation to act as they require, but this is not to 
say that doctors can direct nurses to do anything they want. For example, a doctor cannot 
place a nurse under a pro-tanto moral obligation to sing for her, as this would clearly fall 
                                                 
22 Below I argue that Raz’s formulation of the idea of “preemption” is too strong, but it is worth noticing 
that even someone like Raz, who grounds the justification of political authority on its capacity to track 
independently correct reasons for action (Raz 1986), agrees that the directives of the authority do not stop 
being binding whenever it makes a mistake. 
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outside the scope of the doctor’s authority. For the same reason, she cannot place a nurse 
under a pro-tanto moral obligation to kill a patient for her. This also falls outside the 
scope of the doctor’s authority. But here is a complication: a doctor who is genuinely 
trying to save a patient’s life can place a nurse under a pro-tanto moral obligation to give 
the patient a certain pill, even if the pill then turns out to kill the patient. For it falls 
within the scope of the doctor’s authority to place nurses under an obligation to do what 
doctors reasonably believe to be in the interest of their patients. And the practical reasons 
created for the nurse by directives that fall within the scope of the doctor’s authority are 
binding independently of their content. 
This might sound odd. Shouldn’t we rather say that nurses acquire reasons to act as 
directed only after they have verified that what they are required to do is indeed in the 
interest of the patient? No, because if that was the case, nurses could not be said to be 
under the doctor’s authority. The doctor’s directives would have at most an epistemic 
function: instead of providing nurses with practical reasons, they would simply indicate 
that there is reason for nurses to believe that, say, giving a certain pill to the patient is the 
right course of action. But a hospital in which nurses take doctors’ decisions as mere 
advice, rather than authoritative directives, is one in which we would not want to find 
ourselves. For the efficiency of a hospital largely depends on the capacity of doctors to 
rely on the fact that their directives will be taken as authoritative.23 
Notice that none of this is supposed to suggest that authoritative directives can never 
be disobeyed. We can imagine cases in which a nurse has very strong evidence that a 
certain pill will kill the patient, and in these cases we will want to say that the nurse’s all-
                                                 
23 Of course it might be part of the job of nurses to express their doubts about the dangers of certain 
medical treatments. 
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things-considered duty is to not give it to him, at least if the nurse is sufficiently 
confident in his belief that the pill would be lethal to the patient.24 The point here is that 
this duty overrides an existing pro-tanto duty that the nurse has to act as required by the 
doctor – a pro-tanto duty that is created by the exercise of the doctor’s legitimate 
authority, even when the doctor makes a mistake. This dynamic, and its application to the 
question of the duty to obey the order to fight, will be further explored in the next section.  
 
4) The presumptive nature of the duty to obey 
The aim of the previous section was to explain what produces the “moral alchemy” that 
gives legitimate states the moral power to place their subjects under a pro-tanto 
obligation to act in ways that would otherwise be morally impermissible, provided that 
these states are acting “in good faith.” I have done this in two steps. First, I have 
suggested that the reason why legitimate states have the moral power to impose 
obligations on us is that being under the authority of legitimate states is the only way in 
which we can discharge our natural duty not to expose others to the dangers of the state 
of nature. Second, I have suggested that whilst only legitimate states impose moral 
obligations on us, they do so even when they require us to do something unjust, provided 
that they are acting within the scope of their authority. For if their directives were not 
content-independent, states would not be able to perform the coordinative function that 
justifies their existence. (Since it is by producing binding, content-independent reasons 
for action that states can perform this function.)25 
                                                 
24 I discuss this claim at length below. 
25 Christopher Wellman is the only philosopher I am aware of who defends the view that there is a duty to 
obey the law of legitimate states, but this duty is limited to just laws (Wellman 2005, 81–84). However, 
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 I have not provided a defence for either of these views, but this was not my aim. 
Rejecting philosophical anarchism is beyond the scope of this paper. My aim was rather 
to show how natural duty based accounts of political legitimacy, if sound, can be 
employed to answer the “moral alchemy” objection. The argument of this paper is 
premised on the assumption that states can enjoy political legitimacy, and that when they 
do, they have the moral power to create moral obligations for their subjects.26 I argue that 
if we accept this widely shared assumption, we should conclude that the moral alchemy 
that gives political authorities the moral power to impose on us a pro-tanto obligation to 
fight an unjust war is the moral alchemy that gives them the moral power to impose on us 
a pro-tanto obligation to do anything.27 Under the assumption that the state is legitimate, 
its command to fight an unjust war does not work any differently from any other 
command, such as the command to pay our taxes or to respect traffic law. But we have 
seen that a state is legitimate only if it is reasonably just. And surely a state is not 
reasonably just if it intentionally fights unjust wars, which involve killing innocents 
without justification. A reasonably just state will require its citizens to fight an unjust war 
only when it’s making an “honest mistake,” i.e. when it’s genuinely trying to pursue a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Wellman does not distinguish between the two types of unjust laws identified in the previous section, and 
only considers laws that are unjust because they fall outside the scope of the authority. About those, he is 
certainly right that they cannot create a pro-tanto duty to obey. But as we have seen, this is not to say that 
unjust laws enacted by a state operating within the scope of its legitimate authority also fail to create such a 
duty, at least when the state is acting in good faith. 
26 Those interested in how natural duty accounts of legitimacy can be defended should look at the texts 
mentioned in footnotes 19-20. On content-independence, see Raz 1986, 35–7; Hart 1982, 243–68; Green 
1988, 41–62, 225–6.  
27  By “anything” I mean “any of the things the state may order us to do, insofar as they fall within the 
scope of its authority.” As we have seen, all authorities are limited in scope and cannot create obligations in 
relation to matters that fall outside the scope of their authority. 
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just cause but failing to do so (or, as I have put it before, when it’s acting “in good 
faith”).28  
So, either my state is legitimate or it is not. This will depend, among other things, 
on whether it is reasonably just. If my state is not reasonably just, and therefore is 
illegitimate, I have no pro-tanto duty to obey any of its laws or commands, including, of 
course, its command to fight an unjust war. I might have a duty to conform to some of 
them to the extent that I have independent moral reasons to act as they require, but not a 
duty to obey, i.e. to act as required because the authority said so.29 If my state is 
reasonably just and the war I am required to fight is unjust, I have a pro-tanto obligation 
to obey, provided that my state is acting in good faith, but this obligation may be 
overridden, under certain conditions, by the independent moral obligation I have not to 
contribute to the unjustified killing of innocents. 
Thus, revisionists are certainly right that when state A unjustly attacks state V, V’s 
citizens cannot become liable to being killed simply in virtue of the special political 
relations existing among the members of A. However, these relationships can nonetheless 
create some reasons for A’s citizens to fight, reasons which will then have to be weighed 
against the reasons they have not to fight (grounded in the rights of V’s citizens not to be 
                                                 
28 The idea of an “honest mistake standard” is introduced by Estlund. A mistake counts as “honest” in this 
context when it’s the product of a “legitimate, though necessarily fallible, effort to inflict the harm only if it 
is just to do so” (Estlund 2007, 221). 
29 This explains why, for example, German citizens had a duty to respect traffic law or tort law under the 
Nazi regime. On the distinction between obeying the authority and conforming to it, see Raz 1999, 178–86; 
Simmons 1979, chap. 8  
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killed). Although the reasons created by the orders of a legitimate political authority 
cannot affect what rights other people have, they can weigh against those rights.30 
The further point I would like to make now is that we do have a duty to find out: 
a) whether our state is legitimate; b) whether the legitimate state to which we belong is 
requiring us to act unjustly. This is because while states normally do a lot of good, they 
can also do a lot of harm. Illegitimate states, where their illegitimacy depends on the fact 
that they pursue unjust causes such as fighting unjust wars, typically do a lot of harm; and 
we have a duty to make sure that we are not accomplices in this harm. But legitimate 
states too can occasionally be responsible for causing unjustified harm, although acting 
with the best intentions (as it is the case when they wage an unjust war in good faith), and 
we also have a duty to make sure that we are not accomplices in this harm.  
Of course, there are different kinds of harm that a legitimate state can perpetrate. 
Unnecessary taxes, forms of discrimination, and unjust trade policies are obvious 
examples. Even something as trivial as an unnecessary traffic light constitutes in a sense 
a form of unjustified harm, as it sets back our interests by constraining our liberty without 
good reason. This last sort of injustice however, is one that we should not care too much 
about, given how insignificant it is in comparison to the crucially important functions that 
states perform. On the other end of the spectrum is the injustice that states perpetrate 
when they fight unjust wars, since this involves unjustifiably killing innocents. This 
injustice is so serious that we have a duty to take steps to ensure that we are not 
accomplices in it.  
                                                 
30 I elaborate on this point below, pp. 35-8.  
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This suggests that (in line with revisionism) individuals must indeed take 
responsibility for their actions, but (contra revisionism) in doing so they should also 
acknowledge that to the extent that they are acting as members of a legitimate state, 
special reasons for action apply to them. These reasons should be factored into their 
deliberation. The crucial task now is to explain how these reasons should operate in their 
deliberation. 
We have seen that the function of these reasons is to constrain the practical 
reasoning of those subject to the authority. How do they do that? When the authority 
requires that we φ, we do not merely acquire new moral reasons to φ, reasons that we did 
not have before the directive was issued. What we acquire are moral reasons to φ that are 
endowed with special normative force. According to Raz’s classic analysis, the reasons 
that the authority gives us to φ are “protected,” in that they are combined with special 
second-order reasons that require us to exclude from our deliberation some of the first-
order reasons that we might have not to φ (Raz 1999).31 The reasons excluded from 
deliberation are those that the authority was meant to consider in issuing its directive. 
After all, the point of obeying the authority is to do what the authority requires “because 
the authority has said so,” i.e. independently of the merits of what we are required to do. 
While we are allowed, according to Raz, to think about the reasons that the authority has 
considered in issuing its directive, we are not allowed to consider these reasons in 
                                                 
31 “First-order reasons” are normal reasons for action grounded in self-interest, desires or morality; 
“second-order reasons” are reasons that we have to act (or refrain from acting) on first-order reasons. The 
reason you have to eat a doughnut if you are craving one is a first-order reason. Now, suppose you 
promised your wife not to eat doughnuts. This is a second-order reason for you not to act on this first-order 
reason. 
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deliberating about how to act. To follow the directive is precisely to disregard these 
reasons in our deliberation.32 
The model of “exclusionary” (or, as Raz sometimes calls them, “pre-emptive”) 
reasons, however, shows its limits when we are dealing with cases like my nurse example 
above. Under the assumption that the doctor’s directive falls within the scope of her 
authority, the model of exclusionary reasons commits us to the implausible conclusion 
that the nurse should simply follow the directive even if she is justified in believing (and 
sufficiently confident in her belief) that the pill will in fact kill the patient. Within the 
model of exclusionary reasons there is no room for the nurse to disobey, because the 
nurse is not allowed to include in her deliberation any of the competing first-order 
reasons that the doctor should have considered before issuing the directive. Those 
reasons, within Raz’s model, are to be excluded from her deliberative process (Perry 
1988; Regan 1988; Schauer 1991a, 88–93; Gur 2007). This suggests that we should reject 
the model of exclusionary reasons and look for alternatives.33  
I contend that a more convincing model is one that characterizes the special 
binding force of the second-order reasons provided by the authority as presumptive, 
                                                 
32 Here I adopt David Owens’ formulation of Raz’s view, which is slightly different from Raz’s (Owens 
2008, 413–14). Raz claims that we are permitted to deliberate about excluded first-order reasons, as long as 
we don’t act on those reasons. As Owens notices however, this is only because Raz takes deliberation to 
simply involve thinking about those reasons, as opposed to thinking about them with the aim of settling 
what to do. This latter possibility is precisely what Raz’s “exclusionary reasons” rule out (by precluding 
competing first-order reason to be balanced against them). I’ll stick with Owens’ formulation as I find it 
clearer, but nothing substantive hangs on this choice. My arguments can be easily reformulated in Raz’s 
terms. 
33 Defenders of the exclusionary reasons model might be tempted to reply that their model can be rescued 
by stipulating that clearly mistaken directives are not binding. For a discussion of the reasons why this 
reply will not work, see Gur 2007.  
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rather than exclusionary in nature. Like Raz, I believe that the function of authorities is to 
constrain the practical reasoning of those subject to them; and like him, I believe that 
authorities do so by providing their subjects with “protected reasons” that combine first-
order reasons to act as the authority orders (reasons that the agents subject to the 
authority did not have before the directive was issued) with second-order reasons that 
require those subject to the authority to disregard, to some extent at least, in their 
deliberation some of the competing reasons that they might have to act otherwise. 
However, within the presumptive reasons model, these competing reasons are not 
excluded altogether from the deliberation of the agent. Rather, the second-order reasons 
created by the authority merely create a presumption in favour of their exclusion. If we 
are justified in believing that the authority has made a mistake in ordering us to φ, and we 
are sufficiently confident in our belief, the underlying first-order reasons to not-φ are not 
excluded and can be balanced in the deliberative process. When this epistemic threshold 
is met, the presumption in favour of obedience has been rebutted, and the reasons against 
φ-ing can be balanced with the first-order reasons to φ provided by the authority (and 
other moral reasons to φ we might have).34  
But how do we know that the authority has made a mistake? Frederick Schauer, 
who discusses a similar model in relation to rules more generally, appeals to “the idea of 
a casual look, a glimpse, a peek, a preliminary check, pursuant to which a decision maker 
follows the recognized rule unless some other factor overtly intrudes on her decision 
                                                 
34 Notice that once the epistemic threshold is met at t1, the reason to φ created by the authority does not 
figure again into our deliberation at t2. The role of the presumptive reason is exhausted at t1, whether the 
presumption has been rebutted or not. If it wasn’t, the same reason would be counted twice in our practical 
deliberation.  
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making process. Implicit in [this view] is a phenomenology such that the decision maker 
is open to the possibility of the presumption being overcome, but does not actively pursue 
it, or can do a quick check short of a thorough inquiry” (1991b, 677). While largely 
correct, this way of thinking about the strength of the duty to obey authoritative 
directives, is incomplete.  
In those areas of decision making in which we have reason to believe that: a) the 
authority might be biased or prone to make mistakes, and b) these mistakes would lead to 
the perpetrations of serious injustice, something more than a “glimpse” or a quick check 
is required. When these two conditions are met, we have a duty to actively scrutinize the 
decision of the authority, and eventually disobey, if it turns out that the authority has 
made a mistake and there are countervailing reasons sufficiently strong to justify 
disobedience. Indeed, I suggest that in these cases, the amount of scrutiny that should be 
devoted to assessing the justification of disobedience is directly proportional to the 
likelihood of mistakes being made by the authority and the seriousness of the injustice 
that would follow. 
Thus, while the reasons created by the authority are indeed “protected,” and 
should not simply be balanced with the other first-order reasons that apply to us, they are 
less protected than the model of exclusionary reasons grants.35 Raz is certainly correct in 
saying that “if every time a directive is mistaken … it were open to challenge as 
mistaken, the advantage gained by accepting the authority as a more reliable and 
successful guide … would disappear” (Raz 1986, 61). But accepting this claim does not 
                                                 
35 Following David Enoch, we might call these reasons “quasi protected.” Although Enoch does not discuss 
presumptive reasons, the latter are a variety of his quasi protected reasons, i.e. “reasons not to deliberate in 
some ways or on some reasons” (Enoch 2014, 321) 
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commit us to the conclusion that we should never challenge the authority when its 
directives are mistaken, as the exclusionary model requires. It only commits us to the 
conclusion that we should not do so every time its directives are mistaken. The advantage 
gained by having the authority is not lost if we challenge its directives in a limited 
number of cases. The cases in which we should do that, I submit, are those in which we 
are justified in believing that the authority has made a mistake that will lead to serious 
injustice and we are sufficiently confident about this belief. In these cases, our all-things-
considered duty is to disobey.36 Moreover, I have suggested (contra Schauer) that our 
duty is not only to disobey when it is obvious that the authority has made a mistake. 
Whenever we have reason to believe that the authority might be prone to make mistakes, 
we have a duty to carefully investigate the correctness of the decision and disobey if 
complying would lead to the perpetration of serious injustice. 
 
5) Defending the “presumptive reasons” model 
In section 4, I introduced the model of presumptive reasons and argued that it provides a 
more convincing account of the binding force of authoritative directives than the 
traditional model of exclusionary reasons. In this section, I will defend the presumptive 
reasons model by considering four objections to it. In addressing them, my aim is to 
further clarify the structure of the model and its implications for the problem of whether 
there can be a duty to obey the order to fight an unjust war waged in good faith by a 
legitimate state.  
                                                 
36 Of course, there might be reasons to act as we are required by the directive, for example, when failing to 
do so will undermine respect for the law in those cases in which obedience is required. I bracket these 
considerations here.  
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A pair of objections targets the idea that by allowing the possibility to investigate 
the correctness of the decision made by the authority, and to include the outcome of this 
investigation in the deliberative process of the agent, the notion of presumptive reasons 
undermines the whole point of having the authority. Did we not see that authorities are 
able to perform their function only if they generate content-independent reasons for 
action, rather than reasons whose binding force depends on their being correct? And did 
we not see that these reasons are supposed to constrain the deliberation of those subject to 
the authority, so that they will not have to act on the balance of reasons? On the face of it, 
the model of presumptive reasons might seem at odds with both claims, insofar as it 
states that authoritative directives are not binding when mistaken and that we should 
balance the reasons we receive from the authority, instead of having those reasons 
constrain our deliberation. 
In fact, the model is not at odds with either claim. Within the presumptive model, 
the reasons created by the authority are indeed content-independent, because they create a 
presumption that we will have to act as the authority requires, independently of whether 
the authority is correct in issuing a certain directive. That our all-things-considered duty 
is to disobey the authority when we are sufficiently confident that we are ordered to do 
something profoundly unjust does not depend on the fact that authorities create content-
dependent, rather than content-independent, reasons for actions, but on the fact that they 
create presumptive, rather than exclusionary ones.  
This brings us to the second objection, namely that the model of presumptive 
reasons seems to ultimately require that when we are ordered to φ, we balance the first-
order reasons we have for and against φ-ing, whilst this is precisely what the presence of 
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authority is meant to rule out. The value of having practical authorities, as we have seen, 
is that they constrain our deliberation in a way that ultimately makes a difference as to 
how we ought to act. But if what we should do, at the end of the day, is simply balance 
the first-order reasons we have for and against φ-ing, it looks as if the authority doesn’t 
make much of a difference after all.  
This objection also misses the mark because presumptive reasons do indeed 
constrain the deliberation of those subject to the authority. When the authority orders us 
to φ, we acquire reasons to φ that are endowed with special normative force: we normally 
ought not to balance them with our first-order reasons. True, there is an epistemic 
threshold that, if met, allows the inclusion within our deliberative process of the first-
order reasons to not-φ that the authority meant to exclude. But only occasionally will the 
threshold be met. When it is not met, agents should act as directed and φ “because the 
authority said so,” instead of balancing the reasons to φ with competing reasons to not-φ.  
It would be a mistake to think that because of this, the authority makes no 
significant practical difference, and that all we are left with is the need to deliberate about 
first-order reasons. There will be many cases in which the epistemic threshold will not be 
met (i.e. in which we will not be epistemically justified in believing that the authority has 
made a mistake), and in those cases our deliberation will be genuinely pre-empted. Those 
are cases in which our reasons to act as the authority requires are undefeated, and thus we 
are under a duty to obey, even if the authority has made a mistake and complying will 
lead us to perpetrate a serious injustice.37 Once again, this is not because of what would 
                                                 
37 That we are under a pro-tanto duty to obey the authority also makes a difference to our reasons for action 
when we do meet the epistemic threshold and, after deliberating about first order reasons, we establish that 
the reasons to obey are defeated. However, we need to be careful in spelling out what the difference is in 
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happen if we were to disobey the order (this would be falling back into a teleological 
understanding of the duty to obey), but because legitimate authorities have the power to 
create new reasons for action when they operate within the scope of their authority. These 
reasons need to be factored into the deliberation of those subject to the authority. 
 The third objection I will consider is that the model of presumptive reasons blurs 
the distinction between epistemic and practical reasons. Presumptive reasons might seem 
a strange hybrid between the two, which would undermine the credibility of the model. 
This worry can be addressed by clarifying that presumptive reasons are genuine practical 
reasons (i.e. reasons for action) and not epistemic ones (i.e. reasons to believe). My view 
is not that since legitimate states are more likely to individuate morally correct courses of 
actions, when they requires us to φ, we thereby acquire presumptive reasons to believe 
that φ is what we have a duty to do; reasons which can be then overridden if we have 
                                                                                                                                                 
this case. Once the reasons to φ created by the authority have been defeated, they are no longer operative. 
But while we no longer have reasons to φ created by the authority, we typically have other reasons for 
action that are generated by the fact that the authority ordered us to φ: for example, we might have reason 
to explain our behavior and answer for our failing to φ (to the authority or to someone else). Consider again 
the nurse case. If the nurse meets the epistemic threshold, the presumption in favour of obedience has been 
rebutted, and thus the nurse will have to deliberate about whether to administer the pill or not by appealing 
to first order reasons. Assuming that the reasons to administer the pill to the patient are defeated, the nurse 
has no reason to do so in virtue of the fact that the doctor ordered her. However, he will have reasons to 
answer to the doctor (or the hospital) for failing to administer the pill. Suppose that a second doctor 
(doctor*) from some other hospital, who has no legitimate authority over the nurse, orders him –perhaps 
mistakenly thinking that the nurse is in fact hers– to administer a lethal pill to a different patient (patient*). 
Suppose further that the nurse has no choice but to administer the pill to one of the two patients, in order to 
avoid some moral catastrophe. Once the reasons to obey the directives of his own doctor have been 
defeated, the nurse has no more reasons to give the pill to patient than to patient*. (She should probably flip 
a coin to decide who to administer the pill to.) However, while the nurse has reasons to answer to his doctor 
if he fails to administer the pill to the patient, he has no reasons to answer to doctor* for failing to 
administer the pill to patient*.  
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access to other epistemic reasons that rebut this presumption. States are practical 
authorities and, as we have seen, practical authorities cannot perform their coordinative 
functions by providing us with epistemic reasons, but only by creating reasons for action. 
However, certain reasons for action can be dependent on a given epistemic threshold 
being fulfilled.38 There is nothing mysterious about that. Indeed, this is how presumptions 
normally operate within the law.  
 The presumption of innocence is an example. Saying that there is a presumption 
that the defendant is innocent until proved guilty is not saying that the jury and the judge 
should believe that she is innocent. Rather the presumption of innocence is practical in 
nature: it’s a maxim that prescribes to treat the defendant in a certain way unless a given 
epistemic threshold is met. Roughly, the prescription is that the defendant should not be 
punished unless the epistemic threshold required to prove guilt is met (Ullman-Margalit 
1983). Similarly, the presumptive reasons in my model are reasons that prescribe to treat 
the directives of legitimate states in a certain way (as reasons that we should act upon 
without balancing them with competing first-order reasons), unless a given epistemic 
threshold is met (the threshold that allows the inclusion within our deliberative process of 
the first-order reasons that the authority intended to exclude). Both in the case of the 
presumption of innocence and in the case of the presumptive model of authority, the 
agents receive genuine practical reasons: reasons to act in a certain way under certain 
conditions. 
The final objection I will consider does not challenge the internal coherence of the 
model of presumptive reasons, but its plausibility when applied to the problem of war. 
                                                 
38 The question of how the epistemic threshold should be set exactly is a difficult one. I intentionally 
bracket it for the purposes of this paper. 
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My argument is that when a legitimate state wages an unjust war, we are under a duty to 
comply with its order to fight unless the presumption in favour of obedience is rebutted. 
Moreover, we have a duty to ascertain whether the presumption is rebutted. However, I 
granted that there is no reason to believe that the presumption will be rebutted every time 
the state is making a mistake. For the presumption will be rebutted only when the 
epistemic threshold that allows appealing to first-order reasons is met; and whether this is 
the case, will depend in turn on the different epistemic positions of those subject to the 
authority.39  
 To this view we might object as follows: even if I am right that states are 
necessary to avoid the injustices typical of the state of nature, and that this grounds a duty 
to obey them, we have seen that there are limits to what falls within the scope of their 
authority. Why not think that the right to wage war is one of those limits? Since states are 
prone to make mistakes in waging wars, and the consequences of these mistakes involve 
the perpetration of serious injustices, perhaps we should conclude that while we are under 
the authority of states in a number of other domains, we are not under their authority with 
respect to war-related matters. According to this view, states have the power to create 
pro-tanto obligations when it comes to traffic law or healthcare, but not when it comes to 
waging wars.40  
                                                 
39 Notice that this means that if Andy’s epistemic position is superior to Ben’s, it might well be that Ben is 
under a duty to obey, whereas Andy isn’t. Andy and Ben will be subject to the same pro tanto duty to obey 
the law, but their all-things-considered duty to act as the law requires will be different. 
40 It’s important not to conflate this objection with a different one, namely that while we are under the 
authority of states when they order us to wage just wars, we are not under their authority when they order 
us to wage unjust wars. This objection is a non-starter because, as we have seen, the duty to obey the law of 
legitimate states is not limited to just laws. States could not successfully perform their coordinative 
function if the reasons for action they purport to create were content-dependent.  
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In order to assess this objection, we need to compare how effective we would be in 
discharging our duties of justice in a world in which legitimate (hence reasonably just) 
states have this power and how effective we would be in doing so in a world in which 
they don’t. This is because the justification of political authority, as we have seen, is 
instrumental in nature: we are subject to political authority because this enables us to 
discharge some of our most important duties of justice. If so, in determining which 
matters should fall within the scope of political authority, we’ll have to look at the areas 
of conduct in relation to which we are unable, or significantly less likely to be able, to 
discharge these duties effectively if we are not subject to the authority of the state.  
Now, assessing how effective we would be in discharging our duties of justice in a 
world in which war-making does not fall within the scope of political authority is not 
easy, if only because it is hard to imagine what the second world would look like. One 
thing seems clear enough though: a world in which states lack the right to wage wars 
would not be a world without wars. The worry is that it would be a world in which 
violent conflicts between groups would occur nonetheless, only they would not be led by 
political institutions that aim to fight only just wars and to do so by respecting the 
principles of jus in bello. If so, a world in which wars are fought by legitimate states that 
adhere to the principles of just war is a world in which we are better able to discharge our 
duties of justice than a world in which wars are fought by these other groups. And if this 
is true, the fact that states will occasionally fight unjust wars in good faith is not enough 
to deprive them of the right to wage war, which comes with the power to generate pro-
tanto reasons for their subjects to do so. 
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Grasping this point enables us to see why we should resist a worry that McMahan has 
raised against political arguments, namely that when the malfunctioning of political 
institutions leads to an unjust war, the costs of this malfunctioning should be borne by the 
members of those institutions, who benefited from their existence, not by non-members. 
As he puts it, “a person who occupies a role in an institution that is just overall may have 
a strong moral reason to continue to adhere to the requirements of her role even when she 
believes that the institution is functioning unjustly, provided that the victims are members 
of the group the institution serves. But if the victims aren’t members of the group by and 
for whom the institution has been constructed, as is true when a normally just military 
fights an unjust war, the reason a participant has to fulfill the requirements of her role 
must generally yield to the demands of justice” (McMahan 2006, 387). 
The problem with this objection is that it fails to recognize that when it comes to war-
making, it is in everybody's interest that individuals are under the authority of legitimate 
states acting in good faith. For when this is the case, all citizens of all states are 
constrained by their own state's good-faith decision as to whether to wage war and how to 
fight. It is misleading to suggest that while the Danes owe a duty of obedience to their 
state, this duty can never justify imposing harm on the Swedes. For, assuming that 
Denmark is a legitimate state acting in good faith, it is in the interest of the Swedes that 
the Danes are constrained by their state’s decision as to when they can wage war against 





5) The duty to obey and the duty to fight 
This paper has offered a “political argument” for the duty to fight unjust wars waged in 
good faith by legitimate states. I have suggested that legitimate states perform crucially 
important functions, which are necessary to avoid the dangers of the state of nature; but 
they can do so only if they have the moral power to impose pro-tanto moral duties on 
their subjects, a power that does not disappear when states make “honest mistakes.”  
A pro-tanto duty is always defeasible, but it does create a presumption that our all-
things-considered duty is to act as required. This is why when a legitimate state orders us 
to fight, we are in a very different position from the one described by revisionists such as 
McMahan. According to the latter, we should presume that our duty is not to fight, unless 
we are sufficiently confident that the war is just; whereas according to my view, when a 
legitimate state acting in good faith orders us to fight, our presumptive duty is to obey, 
unless we are sufficiently confident that the war is unjust. While we do have a duty to 
investigate this presumption, there is no guarantee that it will be rebutted every time the 
state is making a mistake. For the presumption will be rebutted only when the epistemic 
threshold that allows appealing to first-order reasons is met; and whether this is the case, 
will depend in turn on the different epistemic positions of those subject to the authority.  
However, my view sides with revisionists in two respects. First, it acknowledges that 
some combatants will have an all-things-considered duty to disobey the order to fight. 
Generally, this will be true of whoever is epistemically justified in believing that the war 
is unjust and sufficiently confident about this belief. Those who meet this epistemic 
threshold are allowed to balance first-order reasons against fighting with the reasons in 
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favour of obedience,41 and in that case the former will normally defeat the latter.42 
Second, like revisionists, I argue that we do have a duty to investigate whether the war 
we are asked to fight is unjust. Our duty is not only to disobey if we have sufficient 
reasons to believe that the war we are asked to fight is unjust, but also to do what we can 
to find out whether the war is unjust.43  
On the other hand, my view is close to the orthodox account in that it acknowledges 
that there will be at least some combatants who will have an all-things-considered duty to 
obey the order to fight an unjust war (provided that the war is being waged by a 
legitimate state acting in good faith). This will be true of whoever is not epistemically 
justified in concluding that the war is unjust after having fulfilled his duty to investigate 
the correctness of the decision to fight. Given their epistemic limits, some combatants 
will fail to meet the epistemic threshold required to allow the first-order reasons against 
fighting to be balanced against the reasons in favour of obedience. When this is the case, 
                                                 
41 How many combatants will meet the threshold will depend on: a) their personal expertise and factual 
knowledge; b) how obvious the injustice of the war is. Some wars are so obviously unjust that very few 
combatants will fail to meet the epistemic threshold, but as revisionists acknowledge, often the epistemic 
limitations afflicting combatants are so severe that they cannot be overcome by most (McMahan 2009, 60–
65, 119–21).  
42 Normally, but not always. For example, if failing to obey the order to fight would lead to disastrous 
consequences, the all-things-considered duty might be to obey (particularly when one’s participation will 
not significantly contribute to the advancement of the unjust cause). 
43 I leave aside here complications related to the fact that segments of an unjust war can be just, and thus 
combatants lacking an overall just cause might have a duty to fight in them. These complications do not 
affect the thrust of my view, although they will call for more complex assessments of what our all-things-
considered duty is. For example, after having established that my state is pursuing an unjust cause, and thus 
the presumption in favour of obeying the order to fight has been rebutted, I might realize that there are 
reasons to fight a segment of it. 
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the presumption in favour of obedience is not rebutted and thus the pro-tanto duty to obey 
the order to fight is undefeated, even if the war is unjust.  
Here is where the question of the objective justification of the war and the question of 
how combatants are justified –indeed, morally required– to act come apart. Whether a 
particular war is justified depends on whether jus ad bellum principles are met. But, 
contra revisionism, it’s not enough that a war is unjustified to conclude that combatants 
have decisive reasons not to take part in it.44 When the conditions described above are 
met, citizens of a legitimate state might have an all-things-considered justification for 
taking part in the war, despite it being unjust. For although they are fighting on the unjust 
side, these citizens are nonetheless acting according to their undefeated moral reasons. 
They are morally innocent not simply in the sense that they are blameless,45 but in the 
sense that they are justified in so fighting. They are justified because fighting is what they 
have moral reasons to do all-things-considered. 
As others have noticed, the situation of these citizens is similar to the situation of a 
judge who convicts an innocent person in good faith once the trial has established beyond 
any reasonable doubt that she is guilty. When this is the case, the judge is not merely 
excused for convicting the defendant. She is justified, indeed morally required, to do so, 
given the special reasons for action that apply to her in virtue of the role she occupies.46 
Similar special reasons for action apply to citizens in virtue of the role they occupy.47  
                                                 
44 To be sure, revisionists also allow for the exceptions based on the caveat mentioned in footnote 42. 
45 Revisionists readily concede that combatants fighting on the unjust side might be excused when they are 
misinformed (McMahan 2009, 137–54).  
46 For a discussion of this case in relation to the issues addressed in this paper, see (Estlund 2007) For 
reasons of space, I cannot here compare my argument and Estlund’s. One obvious difference should be 
noted though: whereas Estlund grounds the duty to obey the order to fight unjust wars in the value of 
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This is the most important difference between my view and revisionism. Contra 
revisionism, I’ve suggested that membership in a legitimate political community can 
provide us with reasons for action that justify, as opposed to merely excuse, taking part in 
an objectively unjust war. More importantly, I have done so without rejecting 
reductivism. For the reason why citizens of a legitimate state waging an unjust war in 
good faith have a pro-tanto duty to fight is not that war is a morally distinct domain, 
whose rules are irreducible to the rules of ordinary morality. Rather, my argument is 
based on what ordinary morality requires of us when we act as members of a political 
community. It is part of ordinary morality that special reasons for action are generated 
when we act as members of certain institutions. This explains why under certain 
conditions nurses are justified to act in ways which will turn out to harm the patient or 
why judges are justified to convict someone who is in fact innocent. It also explains why 
under certain conditions citizens are justified to obey the order to fight an unjust war. 
Notice that this justification is not best understood in belief-relative or evidence-
relative terms (Parfit 2011, 150–53). When the relevant conditions are in place, neither 
judges nor citizens act according to reasons that merely exist in virtue of what they 
believe to be the case or reasons that are simply determined by the evidence available to 
them. Rather, they act according to reasons that are generated by the fact that a certain 
                                                                                                                                                 
democratic procedures, I argue that membership in a legitimate state is sufficient to generate the duty 
(under the conditions specified above), whether or not the state in question is a democracy. This makes my 
view more in line with international law, since international law does not make the right of combatants to 
participate in hostilities conditional on their state being a democracy. 
47 Since these reasons are grounded in mere membership in the political community, they should not be 
confused with the reasons generated when combatants sign contracts to obey lawful orders (on which see 
Lazar 2015b).  
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procedure, which they are morally required to adopt, has been followed – a procedure 
that, when completed, generates fact-relative reasons for action.  
For example, a judge is morally required to acquit a defendant if his guilt could not be 
proven beyond any reasonable doubt, even if the judge has good reasons to believe that 
the defendant is guilty based of evidence that had to be suppressed (say, because of how 
it was obtained by the police). The reasons the judge has to acquit the defendant are 
neither belief-relative nor evidence-relative. They are best described as fact-relative, once 
we make clear that the morally relevant fact they track is not that the defendant has not 
committed the crime in question, but rather that the deliberative procedure the judge is 
morally required to follow delivered a verdict of acquittal.48 Similarly, the reasons 
citizens have to fight when ordered to do so by a legitimate state acting in good faith are 
fact-relative, once we make clear that the morally relevant fact they track is that the 
deliberative procedure they are morally required to follow qua citizens generated an all-
things-considered duty to obey. 
Of course, that they are justified in fighting a war that turns out to be unjust cannot 
change the fact that those fighting on the just side are not liable to be killed. Since the 
latter have done nothing to forfeit their right not to be killed, they retain that right, and 
are thus wronged by the unjust attack.49 This is the main reason why they are permitted to 
defend themselves; but in addition to that, a second reason may be provided, once again, 
by the political argument. If those unjustly attacked are also citizens of a legitimate state 
                                                 
48 The judge’s reasons to acquit would be evidence-relative if she had good reasons to believe that the 
deliberative procedure required him to acquit, whereas in fact it required her to convict. 
49 There is nothing mysterious in the thought that it is sometimes permissible to harm non-liable parties. 
Many agree, for example, that this is permissible when harming a non-liable party as a side effect is 
necessary to prevent a much greater harm. 
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waging the defensive war in good faith, they are permitted to take part in the hostilities 
on the same grounds as their opponents. In that case, their right to fight against the unjust 
attack will be overdetermined. 
This conclusion provides what seems to me an ideal reconciliation of orthodoxy and 
revisionism. It vindicates the doctrine of the moral equality, to the extent that it grants 
combatants on both sides a permission to fight (under the conditions specified above), 
while acknowledging at the same time that combatants fighting on the just side are 
wronged by those fighting on the unjust side (since the former have done nothing to lose 
their right not to be killed).50 This may ground compensatory duties and duties to 
apologize, which we do not have towards combatants who are liable to be killed.  
More generally, my view accounts for the two desiderata spelled out at the outset of 
this paper: it is sensitive to an important dimension of our practical life, namely the 
obligations that we have qua members of legitimate states, while acknowledging at the 
same time that the justice of the cause of our state also makes a difference as to whether 
we can permissibly fight. As such, it avoids the main problems afflicting both Walzer’s 
account and revisionism. The view preserves the main insight of revisionism about the 
importance of jus ad bellum considerations for the existence of a permission to fight, 
while rescuing to some extent the moral equality of combatants.51 
                                                 
50 My view vindicates the doctrine of the moral equality of combatants, insofar as it gives some combatants 
fighting on the unjust side a permission to fight. However, it does not vindicate a stronger interpretation of 
the doctrine, according to which combatants are permitted to fight independently of whether their state is 
legitimate or minimally just (McMahan 2006, 385). This is because, as we have seen, states that are 
illegitimate or that fail to be minimally just, lack the power to create pro-tanto obligations for their citizens. 
51 This paper has been a long time in the making, with its first draft dating back to the Summer of 2010. 
The main idea has remained unchanged throughout the years, but the paper has greatly benefited from 
excellent comments I received at various stages from Christian Barry, Saba Bazargan, Jason Brennan, 
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